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Conflict of Laws: Cases-Comments-Questions. By Roger C. 
Cramton and David P. Currie. St. Paul, Minn.: West. 1968. Pp. x.lvii, 
915. $14.50. 
When two new casebooks on the same subject are issued by the 
same publisher within a period of a few months, an explanation is 
called for. In the case of the new Cramton and Currie book on con-
flict of laws, just out, and the Scoles and Weintraub book1 which 
barely preceded it, current controversies about directions of growth 
of the subject, plus increased interest in it, furnish the answer. The 
Scoles-Weintraub volume presents the traditional materials in an 
essentially traditional form (though the materials presented and the 
conflicts theory represented would have shocked Joseph H. Beale a 
few years ago). The Cramton-Currie casebook, on the other hand, 
employs altogether new approaches, both as to the pedagogy and as 
to the philosophical theory of conflict of laws. This volume is for 
questing young conflicts teachers who want to make a fresh start in 
the course and for whom Beale, Story, Huber, and Dicey are only 
historic landmarks. There are enough of these younkers in the law 
schools to create a demand for this newest teaching tool. At the same 
time, the "radicals" of a decade ago-today's "moderates"-will for 
the most part prefer to consider the cases and the issues in a more 
customary order. 
To one who has kept up with cases decided in the 1960's, there 
is nothing startling in the contents of the Cramton-Currie book. One 
would not expect to find very many of the old cases, and indeed the 
book is filled with cases that have attracted attention recently. Nor 
is the inclusion of a considerable amount of excellent text material-
some by the editors and some taken from the writings of other schol-
ars-along with abstracts of hundreds of cases and many thought-
provoking questions, any departure from the format of other top new 
casebooks. Such casebooks, including this one, serve almost the same 
reference purposes as would good textbooks on the same subjects. 
1. F. SCOLES &: E. WEINTRAUB, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAws (1967). 
It also is published by West. 
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What is pedagogically new in the Cramton-Currie book is the se-
quence of the materials-the way they are organized into chapters. 
The three main segments of the law school course--choice of law, 
jurisdiction, and judgments-are taken to have a common theoretical 
base. Since problems of choice of law afford the clearest explanation 
of the nature of that base, this subject is studied first. Because such 
basic problems require some time for study before understanding can 
be achieved, this may be a difficult place for the student to begin. It is 
like teaching swimming by tossing the beginner into the lake; if he 
stays afloat he can be taught the niceties of the strokes later. It can be 
assumed that most third-year law students are capable of staying 
afloat, and this initial difficulty probably affords no real objection to 
presenting the conflicts material first. 
Choice of law is not presented under the standard subject head-
ings (torts, contracts, property, and so forth) but rather in terms of 
choice-of-law theory applicable to all subjects. Materials on jurisdic-
tion, appearing in the middle of the book, are held to a minimum on 
the sound assumption that they have been studied earlier in the law 
school curriculum. Divorce law is presented separately, late in the 
book, because it neither fits in with nor helpfully explains, but rather 
affords historical contrast to, other areas of conflicts law. The total 
effect is to present conflicts as an independent subject in the law-a 
discipline within itself-instead of something to be studied as a sub-
branch of one after another of the traditional law school courses. 
This may largely destroy the review function of the third-year con-
flicts course, and that may be a serious pedagogical loss. The justifica-
tion is that conflicts law in America today is sufficiently important 
that it needs to be studied and understood for its own sake. Another 
traditional incidental function of the conflicts course was to provide 
a sort of analytical study of jurisprudence near the close of the stu-
dent's law school career. This too will fade away, but whatever value 
such analytical study may have had will be more than adequately 
replaced by the socioeconomic and political insights into jurispru-
dence that inhere in a realistic approach to the modern law of 
conflicts. 
Apart from pedagogy, the main feature of the new book is its 
devotion to the studies and writings of a man who tried to make 
sense of modem conflicts law, the late Professor Brainerd Currie. 
The book is dedicated to Professor Currie, and one of its editors is 
his son. Key excerpts from his writings appear throughout the book, 
particularly in the choice-of-law sections, and many of the editors' 
excellent questions (real questions and not just rhetorical ones, de-
spite the editors' modest disclaimer)2 call upon the student to test 
Currie's governmental-interest analysis against the problems and 
2. Cf. Preface, p. xii. 
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conclusions presented in case after case. It must be emphasized that, 
despite the omnipresence of Currie's work, the editors do not try to 
cram acceptance of his theory down the students' throats. On the 
contrary, they leave the master to speak for himself through his rele-
vant writings, and then make sure by asking skeptical questions that 
the student has fair opportunity to decide on his own whether to 
accept Currie unalloyed. 
One conclusion, though, is inevitable from the book's contents: 
some modern version of conflicts law has to be accepted; Beale's 
formulations are simply relics of the past. The law that the student 
discovers through this casebook is law that Beale never knew, nor 
even dreamed of. 
In addition to the excerpts from Brainerd Currie, the editors 
make frequent reference to Ehrenzweig's work and reprint several 
pages from the writings of other conflicts commentators3 whose 
views-though not those of Currie-are still modern. It might be 
inferred that this calls for a choice among the approaches taken by 
these writers, but that does not necessarily follow. There is a clear 
trend in current judicial opinions toward combining all or most of 
the new choice-of-law theories, using each of them to supplement the 
others in supporting results arrived at in particular cases. A qualita-
tive significant relationships test, governmental interest analysis, and 
the five integrated choice-influencing considerations all may appear 
in a single opinion4 and still make reasonably good sense. The point 
may be that a qualitative measurement of significance requires some 
standard for value judgment beyond the mere listing of contacts, 
that interest analysis by itself does not identify all the factors that may 
legitimately influence a court in a choice-of-law decision, and that 
reference to the basic choice-influencing considerations is needed to 
tie the loose ends together. At any rate, the materials in this casebook 
will enable a wide-ranging student to reach his own conclusion. 
One major query, small in relation to the whole casebook but 
important in itself, persists. This relates to the frequent use of the 
term "false conflict" (p. 261, et alia), meaning "no conflict." Among 
commentators, a tendency has developed to use the term "false 
conflict" to describe cases in which the choice of law is easy, or rela-
tively easy, to make. This same tendency is now spreading to the 
courts. After the choice has been made, the decision is buttressed by 
stating that the conflict just resolved was a "false" one since the rea-
sons which influenced the decision favored the choice that was made 
rather than the choice that was rejected. Courts are even beginning 
3. Professors William F. Baxter, David F. Cavers, Robert A. Leflar, Arthur T. 
von Mehren, and Donald T. Trautman. See pp. 316-34. 
4. E.g., Schneider v. Nichols, 158 N.W.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1968); Mitchell v. 
Craft, 211 S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1968); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (Sup. 
Ct. R.I. 1968). 
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to use the question-begging "false conflict" label in hard cases. 
Used in this manner, the concept does not help to decide cases, but 
furnishes only a sort of self-congratulatory approval appended to de-
cisions independently arrived at. A court employing governmental 
interest analysis may conclude that State X's interest, based on the 
relation of its law to the facts, is more substantial than State Y's (it 
will seldom if ever happen that a state which has a real contact with 
the facts in dispute will have no interest at all in their legal effect); 
therefore X's law should govern. That describes a real conflict, now 
resolved, not a false one. To be useful, the term "false conflict" ought 
to be limited to those cases in which the laws of the concerned states, 
or some of them, are the same, so that there is no conflict between the 
laws themselves. This would be in keeping with the point-made 
more than a third of a century ago by David Cavers and now in-
creasingly accepted-that the choice-of-law problem involves a choice 
between laws, not necessarily a choice between jurisdictions. The 
term "false conflict" can be a useful one, but not if it is merely an 
epithet. Since the term appears frequently in the casebook, students 
are entitled to be warned against its misuse. 
This is the best modern casebook on conflict of laws. It is, in fact, 
the only modern one. An experienced law teacher can teach modern 
conflicts law from any casebook that contains the recent cases and the 
relevant current materials, whether or not it is organized-as this one 
is-in terms of modern conflicts law. For a beginning teacher who 
wants to start teaching conflicts in 1969 from a 1969 point of view, 
the Cramton-Currie book will afford maximum guidance. For the 
rest of us, it is another excellent casebook. 
Robert A. Lefiar, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Arkansas 
and 
New York University 
